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In this paper we derive a Phillips curve with a role for higher order expectations of 
marginal cost and future inflation. We introduce a small idiosyncratic component 
in firms’ marginal costs and let the economywide average marginal cost be 
unobservable to the individual firm. The model can then replicate the backward 
looking component found in estimates of the ’Hybrid’ New Keynesian Phillips 
Curve, even though the pricing decision of the firm is entirely forward looking. 
The Phillips curve derived here nests the standard New-Keynesian Phillips Curve 
as a special case. We take a structural approach to imperfect common knowledge 
that allow us to infer whether the assumed information imperfections necessary to 
replicate the data are quantitatively realistic or not. We also provide an algorithm 
for solving a class of models involving dynamic higher order expectations of 
endogenous variables. 
 
Keywords: Calvo pricing, Higher order expectations, Imperfect Common 
Knowledge, New-Keynesian Phillips Curve 
 




In standard New-Keynesian models ﬁrms set prices to equal a mark up over
expected marginal cost. The real marginal cost is determined by both exogenous
and endogenous factors, where the exogenous factors are assumed to be common
among all ﬁrms. While convenient from a modelling perspective, this assumption is
clearly unrealistic. In this paper we relax the assumption of only common exogenous
factors, by assuming a ﬁrm speciﬁc component in marginal costs. This does not
only improve the realism of the model, but it can also help explain the stylized
fact that in estimated so called ’hybrid’ Phillips curves, i.e. when current inﬂation
is regressed on expected and lagged inﬂation as well as current marginal cost, the
coeﬃcient on lagged inﬂation is usually found to be larger than zero and statistically
signiﬁcant. Inﬂation thus appears to be more persistent than marginal cost, its
driving variable. The inertial character of inﬂation is at odds with the baseline
New-Keynesian model, that predicts that the coeﬃcient on the lagged inﬂation
rate should be zero.
The apparent failure of the baseline New-Keynesian model to ﬁtt h ed a t ai sw e l l
documented and has spurred economists to suggest explanations, often involving
some type of mechanical indexation to past prices. Explanations of inﬂation inertia
based on indexing are attractive since they admit relatively parsimonious represen-
tations of realistic inﬂation dynamics, but they all imply some type of non-rational
behavior on the behalf of some ﬁrms. In the model presented here, the inertial
behavior of inﬂation will be driven by optimizing pricesetters. The mechanism is
the following. When there are ﬁrm speciﬁc components in marginal cost, individual
ﬁrms do not know the marginal costs of other ﬁrms with certainty. This implies
that ﬁrms cannot compute the aggregate price level before they choose their own
price. The optimal nominal price of an individual good depends on the aggregate
price level, so ﬁrms need to form an estimate of the aggregate price level to set the
optimal relative price. Through the Calvo mechanism, there is a positive proba-
bility that a ﬁrm’s price may be eﬀective for more than one period. In addition
to forming an estimate of the current aggregate price level, ﬁr m st h u sa l s on e e d
to form expectations of future aggregate price levels to set prices optimally. Firms
have two sources of information: Their own marginal cost and the lagged price level.
The larger the ﬁrm speciﬁc component of marginal cost is, the less accurate is a
ﬁrm’s own marginal cost as an indicator of current and future price levels and the
more important is the observation of lagged inﬂation. With a persistent marginal
cost process and strategic complementarities in nominal prices, lagged inﬂation will
have a positive impact on current inﬂation though this ’information channel ’,
even when all ﬁrms are entirely forward looking. The variance of the ﬁrm speciﬁc
component that is necessary to replicate the observed inﬂation inertia in the U.S. is
about 1/5 (and smaller for the Euro area) of the overall variance of marginal cost,
which we argue is not conspicuously unrealistic.
Apart from providing an explanation of inﬂation inertia, we also present a
method to solve models where agents have private information and make dynamic




Working Paper Series No. 474
April 20051. Introduction
In standard New-Keynesian models ﬁrms set prices to equal a mark up over
expected marginal cost. The real marginal cost is determined by both exogenous
and endogenous factors, where the exogenous factors are assumed to be common
among all ﬁrms. While convenient from a modelling perspective, this assumption is
clearly unrealistic. In this paper we relax the assumption of only common exogenous
factors, by assuming an idiosyncratic component in ﬁrms’ marginal costs. This does
not only improve the realism of the model, but it can also help explain the stylized
fact that in estimated ’hybrid’ Phillips curves of the form
πt = γfEtπt+1 + λmct + γbπt−1 (1.1)
the coeﬃcient on lagged inﬂation is usually found to be larger than zero and statis-
tically signiﬁcant. Inﬂation thus appears to be more persistent than marginal cost,
its driving variable. The inertial character of inﬂation is at odds with the baseline
New-Keynesian model, that predicts that γb should be zero and γf should be equal
to the discount factor of the representative agent.1
The apparent failure of the baseline New-Keynesian model to ﬁtt h ed a t ai sw e l l
documented and has spurred economists to suggest explanations, often involving
some type of mechanical indexation to past prices.2 For instance, Gali and Gertler
(2001) suggest that a fraction of ﬁrms set the price of their own good equal to the
previous periods average reset price plus the lagged inﬂation rate, while Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2003) let a fraction of ﬁrms increase their own good prices
with the lagged inﬂation rate. Both of these explanations of inﬂation inertia are
attractive since they admit relatively parsimonious representations of realistic inﬂa-
tion dynamics, but they have been criticized for being ad hoc. In the present paper
the inertial behavior of inﬂation will be driven by optimizing pricesetters. Under
the assumption of imperfect common knowledge, individual ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to
use lagged inﬂation as an indicator of current and future prices of goods produced
by competing ﬁrms. A strategic complementarity in prices then induces a positive
relation between lagged and current inﬂation, even when the pricing decision of the
ﬁrm is entirely forward looking.
The idea that incomplete adjustment of prices could be explained by information
imperfections dates back to the Phelps-Lucas island model of the 1970’s.3 Recent
papers by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Woodford (2002) revive this idea, and show
how limited information availability, or limited information processing capacities,
can produce persistent real eﬀects of nominal disturbances.4 The model presented
here adds two novel contributions to the literature that are worth highlighting.
First, through the Calvo mechanism of price adjustment the model can be made
consistent with observed average price durations. As a consequence, expectations
of future inﬂation will play a prominent role in determining today’s inﬂation since
there is a positive probability that a ﬁrm’s price may be eﬀective for more than
one period. The dynamic structure of the pricing problem makes existing solution
methods non-applicable and we derive a new algorithm to solve a class of dynamic
linear models with imperfect common knowledge and strategic interaction. Second,
while introducing information imperfections we explicitly specify what quantities
that are observed by the individual ﬁrm. This allows us to make a ﬁrst pass at
1See for instance Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).
2See for instance Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Gali and Gertler (2001), Gali, Gertler and Lopez-
Salido (2003a, 2003b).
3See Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972), (1973) and (1975).
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realistic or not.
In the next section we derive a Phillips curve under the assumptions of imper-
fect common knowledge and Calvo pricing. In Section 3 we use two limit cases of
marginal cost structures that preclude any private information, to show that the
Phillips curve derived in Section 2 nests the standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve
and how idiosyncratic components in ﬁrms’ marginal cost introduces a backward
looking element in the Phillips curve. In Section 4 we deﬁne the concept of hier-
archies of expectations and the assumptions that will be imposed on these to solve
the model. Section 5 presents and discusses the implied dynamics of inﬂation and
higher order expectations under Calvo pricing and imperfect common knowledge
when average marginal cost follows an exogenous process. Section 6 derives a simple
general equilibrium model and compares the implied dynamics of the theoretical
model with actual U.S. and Euro area estimates of the Hybrid New-Keynesian
Phillips Curve. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Phillips Curve under Imperfect Common Knowledge and
Calvo Pricing
In most (perhaps in all interesting) economies, one agent’s optimal decision de-
pends on the decisions of others. In an economy where all ﬁr m sa n da g e n t sa r e
symmetric and all exogenous disturbances are common across ﬁrms and agents,
knowing the actions of others is a trivial task. An agent can, by observing his own
exogenous disturbance, infer the disturbances faced by everybody else and take ac-
tion based on that information knowing that in equilibrium all agents will choose
the same action. This is not possible in an economy with idiosyncratic exogenous
shocks. Instead, each agent have to form an expectation of the other agents’ actions
based on what he can observe directly and on collected information. The expecta-
tion will be imperfect if the collection process adds noise to the observation or if
it takes time. In the model below, monopolistically competitive ﬁrms set prices to
average a constant mark up over real marginal cost and, as in Calvo (1983), there
is an exogenous probability that the price might be eﬀective for more than one
period. Unlike standard New-Keynesian models though, ﬁrms face idiosyncratic
marginal costs and thus cannot compute the current aggregate price level before it
sets its own optimal price. Instead, ﬁrms will form an expectation of the price level
based on the directly observable own marginal cost, and the lagged observation
of the price level. In what follows, all variables are in log deviations from steady
state values. Denote the real marginal cost of ﬁrm j at time t mct(j) and let it
be the sum of the economywide average marginal cost mct and the idiosyncratic
component εt(j)
mct(j)=mct + εt(j) (2.1)
εt(j) ∼ N (0,σ2
ε) ∀j ∈ (0,1).
Average marginal cost mct follows some known, but unobservable, process. Firms
cannot by direct observation distinguish between the idiosyncratic component εt(j)
and the economy wide average component mct, but will use their knowledge of the
average marginal cost process
mc =  (·)
to ﬁlter out the economy wide component from the individual observation. The
ﬁltering problem faced by the individual ﬁrm is thus similar to the problem faced
by the inhabitants of the market ’islands’ in the Lucas (1975) paper, but with
some diﬀerences. In the Lucas Island model, information is shared among agents
7
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expected aggregate price change, while in our model no such information sharing
ever occurs. Firms in our model will thus have diﬀerent preobservation priors while
in Lucas’ model all islands share the same prior. Below, we will show that this
complicates the ﬁltering problem of the agents considerably.
Following Calvo (1983) there is a constant probability (1 − θ) that a ﬁrm will
reset its price in any given period. The price level then follows
pt = θpt−1 +( 1− θ)p∗
t (2.2)
where p∗






Firm j0s optimal reset price is a discounted sum of ﬁrm j’s expected future nominal







i (pt+i + mct+i(j))
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(2.3)
where β is the ﬁrm’s discount factor and Et(j) ≡ Et [·|It (j)] is ﬁrm j’s expectations
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and the lagged price level ps−1 are com-
mon knowledge.
We can rewrite (2.3) as
p∗
t(j)=( 1− βθ)Et(j)[pt + mct(j)] + βθEt(j)p∗
t+1(j) (2.5)
and substitute the price level (2.2) into (2.5) to get
p∗
t(j)=( 1− βθ)Et(j)[θpt−1 +( 1− θ)p∗
t + mct(j)] + βθEt(j)p∗
t+1(j) (2.6)
which shows that the optimal reset price of ﬁrm j depends on the ﬁrm j’s expec-
tation of the average current reset price. Firms thus have to form an expectation
of the average reset price, which in turn depends on the average expectation of
the average reset price, which in turn depends on the average expectation of the
average expectation of the average reset price... and so on until inﬁnity. We can
apply this logic to the optimal reset price of the ﬁrm by taking averages across ﬁrms
of the optimal reset price expression (2.5) and substituting it into (2.6) and then
alternatingly substituting the price level (2.2) and the average reset price into each
other. Rearranging the resulting expression allows us to write current inﬂation as a
function of average higher order expectations (i.e. expectations of expectations of
expectations...and so on) of current marginal cost and future inﬂation, plus a term
that is a weighted diﬀerence between the higher order expectations of the price level
and the actual price level.
πt =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0




+β (1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0






pt − (1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0
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t ≡ Et[Et...Et | {z }
kt i m e s
[xt]]
where Et is the average expectations operator
Et [xt] ≡
Z
E [xt | It(j)] dj. (2.8)
Note that the law of iterated expectations does not hold for expectations of average
expectations when information sets diﬀer across ﬁrms. When the kth order average
expectation of a variable in period s is held in period t,w ed e n o t et h i sb yx
(k)
s|t, i.e.
Et[Et...Et | {z }
[xs]]




In (2.7) estimates of order k is weighted by ((1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
k . Since (1−βθ)(1−θ)
is smaller than unity, the impact of expectations is decreasing as the order of
expectation increases. One should also note that (1 − βθ)(1 − θ) is decreasing
in θ, i.e. higher order expectations are less important when prices are very sticky:
When fewer ﬁrms change their prices in a given period, i.e. when θ is large, average
expectations are less important for the ﬁrms that actually do change prices.
3. Two Limit Cases without Private Information
In the previous section we saw that individual ﬁrms need to estimate the econo-
mywide average marginal cost (and higher order estimates of marginal cost) to set
its own price optimally. To do this, the individual ﬁrm uses its knowledge of the
structure of the economy and the observations of the lagged price level and of its
own marginal cost. The size of the variance of the idiosyncratic component relative
to the size of the variance of the average marginal cost innovation determines how
accurate ﬁrms’ estimates will be. Two limit cases of this variance ratio can help
intuition. When the variance of the idiosyncratic component is set to zero, we show
that (2.7) nests the standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve. In the second case the
variance of the idiosyncratic component is very large, and this will demonstrate how
imperfect common knowledge introduces a link between past and current inﬂation.
Both cases preclude any private information, and hence admit analytical solutions.
In this section as well as in Section 5, we will make the simplifying assumption that
average marginal cost is driven by the exogenous AR(1) process
mct = ρmct−1 + νt (3.1)
νt ∼ N(0,σ2
ν).
This will facilitate the exposition, and in a later section we will show that the
implied dynamics also carry over to a simple general equilibrium setting where
marginal cost are determined by both exogenous and endogenous factors.
9
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ponent of ﬁrms’ marginal costs equal to zero, i.e. σ2
ε =0 , it follows that
mct(j)=mct : ∀ j (3.2)
Since ﬁrms know the structure of the economy, (3.2) implies that there is no un-
certainty of any order. Formally
mc
(k)
t = mct : k =0 ,1,2,....∞. (3.3)
Firms can now compute the current price level perfectly by substituting (3.3) into
(2.7). We thus have
p
(k)
t = pt : k =0 ,1,2,....∞ (3.4)
and (2.7) is reduced to the standard New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
mct (3.5)
where inﬂation is completely forward looking, with marginal cost as the driving
variable. By repeated forward substitution can (3.5) be written as
πt =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(1 − ρβ)−1mct (3.6)
which shows that inﬂation is only as persistent as marginal cost when the individual
ﬁrm’s own marginal cost is a perfect indicator of the economy wide average.
3.2. Large Variance of Idiosyncratic Marginal Cost Component. In this
section we want to illustrate the consequences for inﬂation dynamics when the
observation of a ﬁrm’s own marginal cost holds no information about the econo-
mywide average. This is strictly true only when the variance of the idiosyncratic
marginal cost component reaches inﬁnity, but shocks with inﬁnite variance prevents
us from invoking the law of large numbers to calculate average marginal cost. For
illustrative purposes we will temporarily give up on some mathematical rigor. In
the following example the variance of the idiosyncratic component of a ﬁrm’s mar-
ginal cost is supposed to be ’large enough’ for the ﬁrm to discard its own marginal
cost as an indicator of the economywide average. Instead, each ﬁrm uses only the
common observation of the lagged price level to form an imperfect expectation of
the economy wide average marginal cost. This structure is common knowledge and
implies that there is some ﬁrst order uncertainty about average marginal costs, but
since the ﬁrms know that all other ﬁrms condition on the same information set,
there is no higher order uncertainty. Formally
mc
(1)





t : k,l > 0 (3.8)
Substituting (3.7) and (3.8) into (2.7)y i e l d s
πt =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))mct
+














Working Paper Series No. 474
April 2005The ﬁrst order expectation of marginal cost, mc
(1)
t , can be found by lagging (3.9)
one period and solving for mct−1
mct−1 = Ψ−1πt−1
−
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)














(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
¸
.
Since all terms on the right hand side of (3.10) are known to all ﬁr m si np e r i o dt ,




t−1|t = mct−1. (3.11)
When the idiosyncratic component of marginal cost is very large, there is no in-
formation about the current innovation in the average marginal cost process in the
observation of ﬁrms j’s own marginal cost and the best estimate of the current
average marginal cost is simply
mc
(1)
t = ρmct−1. (3.12)
Substituting the expression for the ﬁrst order estimate of marginal cost into the
inﬂation equation (3.9) gives
πt =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))mct (3.13)
+
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
h




+β (θ − 1)(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)νt
where we used the following relationships
Etπt+1 =









t =( 1 − θ)(1 − βθ)νt (3.16)
(3.14) and (3.15) follow from the law of iterated expectations (which we can apply
to the common ﬁrst order expectation) and (3.16) follows from (B.8) in Appendix
B. Comparing (3.6) with (3.13) demonstrates how relaxing the assumption of only
common shocks introduces an element of backward looking behavior in the Phillips
curve. Apart from current average marginal cost, inﬂation now also depends on
lagged average marginal cost.
To make the role played by lagged inﬂation explicit, we can substitute the ex-
pression for the lagged marginal cost (3.10) into (3.9) to get an expression of current
inﬂation as a function of lagged inﬂation of the form
πt = b γfEtπt+1 + λ1mct − λ2mct−2 + b γbπt−1 + δ1νt − δ2νt−1. (3.17)
11
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b γf = β, b γb =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
ρ (3.18)
λ1 =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ)) (3.19)
λ2 =
µ
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
¶2
ρ (3.20)
δ1 =( θ − 1)(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)β (3.21)
δ2 =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)(θ − 1)
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
βρ (3.22)
The Phillips curve (3.17) demonstrates that lagged inﬂation matters for current in-
ﬂation when the variance of the idiosyncratic marginal cost shocks are large enough
for individual ﬁrms ’ own marginal costs to be uninformative about the economy-
wide average. Lagged inﬂation is then ﬁrms ’ only source of information about the
the marginal costs faced by other ﬁrms and all ﬁrms thus condition on the same
information, which allow us to solve the model analytically. In the general case,
when 0 <σ 2
ε < ∞, neither the lagged price level, nor the observation of a ﬁrms
own marginal cost completely reveals neither the average marginal cost nor other
agents estimates of average marginal cost. Firms will then use both observations
to form higher order estimates of marginal costs and due to the Calvo mechanism,
higher order estimates of future inﬂation.
4. Expectations and Private Information
In the previous section ﬁrms had no private information and ﬁrms’ ﬁrst and
higher order expectations thus coincided. This is not true in the general case,
and we will have to treat ﬁrst and higher order expectations as separate objects.
We will impose some structure on the expectations in order to solve the model.
First we deﬁne the concept of a hierarchy of expectations. Let ﬁrm j’s hierarchy of




















In the solution strategy we will follow, the hierarchy of expectations of current
marginal cost will be treated as the ’fundamental’ variable, or the state, while the
hierarchy of inﬂation expectations will be treated as endogenous to the expectations
of the ’fundamental’ marginal cost hierarchy. We impose two assumptions on ﬁrms’
hierarchies of inﬂation expectations.
Assumption 1: Et(j)πt+s = E [πt+s | It(j)] : j ∈ (0,1),s =0 ,1,2,3,...∞.
Assumption 1 states that ﬁrm j’s ﬁrst order expectation of inﬂation should be
equal to the mathematical expectation of inﬂation, given ﬁrm j’s information set.
This is a standard rationality assumption, imposing that ﬁrms do not make sys-
tematic mistakes, given their information sets.
Assumption 2: Let Fs(j):R∞ → R be a mapping from ﬁrm j’s hierarchy of






















t+s|t (j):k,l,s =1 ,2,3,...∞.
Assumption 2 states that the mapping from ﬁrm j’s marginal cost hierarchy
from order l to inﬁnity to ﬁrm j’s lth order expectation of inﬂation is equivalent
to the mapping from ﬁrm j’s marginal cost expectation hierarchy from order l+m
to inﬁnity to ﬁrm j’s l + m order expectation of inﬂation. In other words, ﬁrms
12
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 474
April 2005believe that if other ﬁrms shared their hierarchy of marginal cost expectations,
they would also share their hierarchy of inﬂation expectations. Taken together,
Assumption 1 and 2 implies that the structural model is common knowledge, i.e.
all ﬁrms believe that all ﬁrms use the true model to form expectations. Since we
will work with a linear model, we can also impose Assumption 1 and 2 on average
expectation hierarchies which will allow us to substitute out all terms involving
inﬂation expectations in the Phillips curve (2.7)a n dg e ti n ﬂation as a function
solely of the hierarchy of average marginal cost expectations. We deﬁne a hierarchy















In the Phillips curve under imperfect common knowledge (2.7)i n ﬂation is deter-
mined by expectations of up to inﬁnite order, which is problematic since we cannot
solve the model using an inﬁnite dimensional state representation. To obtain an
arbitrarily good approximation, we will exploit the fact that the impact of expecta-
tions is decreasing as the order of expectation increases. Intuitively, the magnitude
of a price setter’s response to a unit change in his expectation of marginal cost,
current or future inﬂation is decreasing as the order of expectation increases. In
(2.7) this can be seen from the fact that the term raised to the power of the order
of expectation k, (1 − βθ)(1 − θ)k, is smaller than one. As k becomes large, this
term approaches zero.
To solve the model, we will conjecture that inﬂation is a linear function of the
hierarchy of average expectations up to the k
th
order of average marginal cost
(including k =0 , i.e. actual average marginal cost) and by choosing k large enough,






































 + nvt (4.2)

















column vector and νt is the innovation in the average marginal cost process. At
this stage, we know two things about M. The ﬁrst element of the ﬁrst row of M is
the AR(1) coeﬃcient ρ and all other elements of the ﬁrst row is zero. We also know
that the largest eigenvalue of M has to lie within the unit circle for the model to
be stable.
We use an iterative version of the method of undetermined coeﬃcients to solve
for c, M and n. In the ﬁrst step we treat M and n as given and derive the implied c
by imposing Assumption 1 and 2 on ﬁrms’ inﬂation expectation hierarchies. In the
second step we take c as given and calculate the implied M and n by letting ﬁrms
estimate the average marginal cost hierarchy as a hidden process using the Kalman
ﬁlter. The Kalman ﬁlter will play a dual role.5 Not only will it be used by ﬁrms to
estimate the average marginal cost expectation hierarchy, but since this hierarchy
5The Kalman ﬁlter plays a similar dual role in Woodford (2002). However, due to the forward
looking nature of inﬂation in the present paper, we are not able to reduce the state to a 2x1 vector.
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of motion of the hierarchy, M and n.
Solving the model thus implies ﬁnding a ﬁxed point for c, M and n and the
details are given in the Appendix. After a solution has been found, we check
whether adding one more order of expectations, i.e. increasing k by one and re-
solving the model, changes the impact of a shock to marginal cost on inﬂation
enough to motivate including higher orders of expectations. Once we are satisﬁed
with the accuracy of our solution, we can simulate the model using (4.1) and (4.2).
5. Inflation Dynamics with Private Information and Exogenous
Marginal Cost
In the introduction we set out to show that relaxing the assumption of only com-
mon marginal costs can introduce endogenous inertia in inﬂation, i.e. that inﬂation
becomes more persistent than marginal cost. In this section we will demonstrate
this in a simple setting where marginal costs follows the exogenous process (3.1)
and in the next section we will show that the dynamics implied by introducing idio-
syncratic components will carry over to a simple general equilibrium setting where
marginal cost is a function of both endogenous and exogenous factors.
The parameter determining how inertial inﬂation will be is the ratio between the
variance of the idiosyncratic component of marginal cost and the variance of the
innovation in the economy wide average marginal cost. This ratio determines how
informative ﬁrms’ own marginal cost is as an indicator for average marginal costs.
In addition to these variances, we have to choose values for the parameters that
govern the degree of price stickiness θ, the AR(1) coeﬃcient of the average marginal
cost process (3.1) ρ and ﬁrms’ subjective discount factor β. Typically, data on CPI
are available only with a one month delay and a period in our model should thus
be interpreted as being one month. The model will be parameterized accordingly.
Survey evidence suggests that average price duration is somewhere between 5 and
13 months.6 In the benchmark speciﬁcation, θ will be set to 0.9 which yields an
average price duration of 10 months. For completeness, we will also show how
inﬂation dynamics change as the degree of price stickiness is decreased. Firms
subjective discount factor β is set to 0.995 and the persistence of marginal costs
ρ is set to 0.9. Under this parameterization, k =9is enough to achieve a precise
solution: Adding another order of expectation changes the impact of a marginal
cost shock on inﬂation by less than one thousandth of a percent.
5.1. Inﬂation Dynamics and the Size of the Idiosyncratic Shocks. Figure 1,
where impulse responses of inﬂation subject to a unit shock in average marginal cost
are plotted for diﬀerent values of σ2
ε/σ2
ν, illustrates how the ratio of the variances
σ2
ε/σ2
ν aﬀects the dynamics of inﬂation.
6See Carlton (1986) and Bils and Klenow (2002).
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Inflation Im pulse Response to Unit Average M arginal Cost Shock
 σ 2ε/σ 2 ν =  0
 σ 2ε/σ 2 ν =  1/2
 σ 2ε/σ 2 ν =  2
There are four things that are worth pointing out. First, with a zero idiosyn-
cratic component variance, the model replicates the full information response, with
monotonic convergence to the mean after the shock. Second, with non-zero idiosyn-
cratic marginal cost component the response of inﬂa t i o ni sh u m ps h a p e d ,w i t ht h e
peak of the hump appearing later the larger the ratio σ2
ε/σ2
v is. Third, the larger
this ratio is, the smaller is the ﬁrst period impact of a marginal cost shock and the
lower is inﬂation at the peak. Fourth, though inﬂation is lower initially and at the
peak with a large σ2
ε/σ2
v,i ti ss u ﬃciently more persistent to lie above the responses
of inﬂation with lower variance ratios in the later periods of the graph. Since the
underlying marginal cost shock in all three cases decreases monotonically, and in a
shape identical to the inﬂation response with a zero variance ratio, the humps must
be driven by the dynamics of the higher order estimates of marginal cost. Figure
2 and 3 below shows the dynamics of the hierarchy of marginal cost expectations
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Figure 2 and 3 shows that ﬁrst order estimates move less than the actual shock
on impact, and that the larger the variance of the idiosyncratic component is, the
smaller is the response of ﬁrst order estimates on impact. The idiosyncratic com-
ponent thus works as ’noise’ in the ﬁltering problem, that smooths out estimates of
the innovations in the average marginal cost process. We can also see that higher
order estimates move less than ﬁrst order estimates. The key to understanding the
dynamics of the higher order estimates is that ﬁrms expect other ﬁrms to, on av-
erage, make the systematic mistake they do not believe that they made themselves.
Firms’ ﬁrst order estimate of average marginal cost is unbiased given their infor-
mation set, but they know that on average, shocks are underestimated. Therefore,
for a given change in ﬁrst order expectations on impact, higher order expectations
move less.
The delayed overshooting of higher over lower order expectations in Figure 2
and 3 can be understood with the same logic. In the second period, the impact
period’s price level becomes common knowledge and will be higher than expected,
since the previous period shock was, on average, underestimated. This higher than
expected lagged price level will be attributed partly to the impact of the higher
order estimates but it will also cause ﬁrms to revise their estimates of the underlying
marginal cost shock upwards. Again, ﬁrms will expect other ﬁrms to revise upwards
more than the actual shock warrants, since they believe that others underestimated
the impact period shock more than they did themselves. This eﬀect would not be
present without the endogenous signal that the lagged price level constitutes.
Of course, a negative unit shock to average marginal cost would trigger symmet-
ric but negative responses to both inﬂation and expectations.
5.2. Inﬂation Dynamics and the Degree of Price Stickiness. As mentioned
above, higher order expectations increases in importance as the we increase the
number of ﬁrms that change prices in each period. Below we have plotted inﬂation
impulse response to a unit average marginal cost shock for average price durations
of 5 months (dashed line) and 10 months (solid line).
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As a larger fraction of ﬁrms change their price in each period, inﬂation responds
stronger to a shock. There are two eﬀects at work. For a given individual price
change, the fact that more ﬁrms change their prices of course causes a larger move-
ment in the aggregate price level. Secondly, and less obvious, the magnitude of the
individual ﬁrm’s price change will also increase, since there is a strategic comple-
mentarity between the price of the individual good and the aggregate pricelevel.
6. Inflation Dynamics in a Simple General Equilibrium Model
In this section we will set up a simple general equilibrium model where mar-
ginal cost is determined by both endogenous and exogenous factors. The economy
consists of households who supply labor and consume goods, ﬁrms that produce
diﬀerentiated goods and set prices and a monetary policy authority that sets the
nominal interest rate. The model is standard, except for the structure of the exoge-
nous shocks. The Households experience a common, persistent but mean reverting,
shock to their (dis)utility of supplying labor. Such a shock is estimated in a full
information setting by Smets and Wouters (2003), and in our simple setting this
shock is the only economywide disturbance. In addition to the common preference
shock, ﬁrms experience idiosyncratic shocks to their wage bargaining skills that are
uncorrelated across ﬁrms and time. This is meant to capture, in a stylized way, the
empirical ﬁnding that a signiﬁcant part of the variation in average wages at the ﬁrm
level seem to be random.7 Firms cannot observe wages paid at other ﬁrms, and
thus have to form a hierarchy of average wage expectations. In what follows, lower
case letters denote the log deviations from steady state values of the corresponding

















where Nt is the aggregate labor supply in period t and β is the discount rate. Ct
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April 2005and Ξt is a shock to the disutility of providing labor services which in logs follow
the AR(1) process
ξt = ρξt−1 + νt (6.3)
νt ∼ N(0,σ2
v) (6.4)
Firm j produces the diﬀerentiated good Yt(j), using a linear technology with labor
as the sole input.
Yt(j)=Nt(j) (6.5)
The absence of a storage technology and imposing market clearing implies that
aggregate consumption will equal aggregate production
Yt = Ct (6.6)
where the standard CES aggregator was used again. The Euler equation of the
representative household then implies the IS-equation
yt = Et [yt+1] −
1
γ
(it − Et [πt+1]) (6.7)
where it is the nominal interest rate that follows the Taylor rule
it = φππt + φyyt. (6.8)
The marginal cost of ﬁrm j will be the real wage paid at ﬁrm j, which is determined
by the intratemporal labor supply decision of the households
wt − pt − γct − ϕnt − ξt =0 (6.9)
and a ﬁrm speciﬁc wage bargaining shock εt(j). The bargaining shock introduces
an idiosyncratic component to ﬁrms’ marginal cost and ﬁrm j0s marginal cost will
be
mct(j)=γct + ϕnt + ξt + εt(j) (6.10)
or substituting in (6.5) and (6.6)
mct(j)=( γ + ϕ)yt + ξt + εt(j) (6.11)
Firm j’s marginal cost is thus determined by aggregate output yt, the preference
shock ξt and the idiosyncratic bargaining shock εt(j).
The timing of the model is the following. Fist, the preference shock ξt is realized.
Then, ﬁrms and households bargain over wages, where real wages are contracted in
the form
wt(j) − pt =( γ + ϕ)yt + ωt(j) (6.12)
where ωt(j)=ξt + εt(j). Firms cannot by direct observation distinguish between
the shock to preferences and the ﬁrm speciﬁc bargaining shock, but only observe
the sum of the two, ωt(j), and the component dependent on output, (γ + ϕ)yt.T h e
latter can be interpreted as a contract specifying higher hourly wages for (aggregate)
overtime. Firms set prices before production takes place, and due to the overtime
premium ﬁrms do not know their own marginal cost with certainty when prices
are chosen, but have to form an expectation of what the aggregate output level
will be. As before, they will also need to form higher order expectations of current
marginal cost and current and future price levels. When prices are set, households
choose labor supply and consumption simultaneously with the determination of the
interest rate. It is natural to assume that households know the preference shock
with certainty, and we will further assume that there is no information sharing
between households and ﬁrms. Firm j’s information set is thus deﬁned by
It(j)=
©
ωt(j),p s−1,y s−1, ,β,θ,γ,ϕ,σ2
ε,σ2
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April 2005The state of the economy is ﬁrms ’ hierarchy of expectations of the preference
shock ξt. Similar to the previous section, we conjecture a solution in the form

















































 + e nvt (6.16)
e c is now a function of e d,s i n c eﬁrms set prices based on their beginning-of-period
estimate of their own marginal cost












 + ωt(j) (6.17)
Output is chosen by the perfectly informed households who form rational expecta-
tions (in the standard sense) of future inﬂation and interest rates. The preference
shock and ﬁrms’ hierarchy of expectations are treated as k+1predetermined state
variables and yt as a forward looking jump variable. This introduces an additional
step in the solution algorithm, and is described in detail in the Appendix.
6.1. Simulating the Model. Once we have the model in the form of (6.14), (6.15)
and (6.16) we can compare the impulse responses of inﬂation in general equilib-
rium with the impulse responses from the previous section where marginal costs
were entirely exogenous. The following parameterization was used {ρ,θ,γ,ϕ,β} =
{.9,.9,4,5,.995}. Figure 5 plots the impulse response of inﬂation to a unit shock
to preferences.













Figure 4 shows that the responses of inﬂation to a preference shock in the general
equilibrium model is similar to the responses to the exogenous marginal cost shock
from the previous section. The main diﬀerence is that the impulse responses with
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wide component lie closer to the perfect information zero ratio curve. This is due
to the additional information now available to ﬁrms through the observation of
lagged output, which is partly determined by the perfectly informed households.
This makes ﬁrms hierarchy of expectations converge quicker to the true value of
the shock.
Not surprisingly, output responds negatively to a shock to the disutility of sup-
plying labor. This is illustrated in Figure 6, where the responses of output to a unit
shock to preferences is illustrated for the usual values of the idiosyncratic bargaining
shock variance.














Households, having fully informed rational expectations, correctly anticipate the
hump shaped responses of inﬂation under non-zero bargaining shocks. This reduces
households’ expected real interest rates in the Euler equation (6.7) and makes out-
put respond less negatively to the preference shock in the ﬁrst couple of periods
after impact.
6.2. The Model and U.S. and Euro Area Inﬂation Dynamics. In the pre-
ceding sections we have presented qualitative evidence in the form of hump shaped
impulse responses on how imperfect common knowledge can introduce inﬂation in-
ertia. In this section we ask the question whether our model can account for the
observed inﬂation inertia in U.S. and Euro area data, with quantitatively realistic
amounts of information imperfections. We will pursue this question by generat-
ing data from our simple general equilibrium model and estimate the Hybrid New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (1.1) by GMM. If our model is the true data generating
process, then the Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve is of course misspeciﬁed.
The experiment we perform here is thus to check whether the misspeciﬁed econo-
metric model (1.1) applied to our theoretical model would produce results similar
to those obtained when the Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve is estimated on
actual data. Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2003b) provide a range of estimates
for the U.S. and the Euro area, using slightly diﬀerent choices of instruments and
formulations of the orthogonality condition. The estimates of the backward looking
parameter γb ranges from 0.035 to 0.27 for the Euro area and from 0.32 to 0.36
for the U.S. A robust feature across methodologies is that the estimated inﬂation
i n e r t i ai sl o w e ri nt h eE u r oa r e at h a ni nt h eU . S .
The table below displays estimates of the Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(1.1) using simulated data from our theoretical model for diﬀerent ratios of the
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April 2005variance of the bargaining shock and the innovation in the preference shock process.8
σ2
ε/σ2
v γb γf λ
0.1 0.24 0.76 0.015
0.5 0.32 0.68 0.014
2 0 . 4 30 . 5 70 . 0 0 9
The simulated data was transformed to "quarterly" frequencies by taking three
period averages and the orthogonality condition
Et [πt − (1 − γb)πt+1 − γbπt−1 − λmct]=0
was then estimated by GMM using lagged marginal costs and inﬂation rates as
instruments. To approximately replicate the inertia in U.S. inﬂation it is enough
with an innovation variance ratio of 1/2. One should note that this implies a
signiﬁcantly smaller ratio of the bargaining shock over the actual marginal cost (and
thus average real wage) variance, which is a function of the output gap variance
σ2
mc =( γ + ϕ)
2 σ2
e y
where the output gap b yt is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between actual output yt and
the level of output that would prevail under ﬂexible prices yt
























and Σξξ is the variance of the preference shock hierarchy
given by the solution to the discrete Lyaponov equation
Σξξ = f MΣξξf M0 + e ne n0
Plugging in σ2
ε/σ2
v =1 / 2 in the benchmark speciﬁcation yields variance ratio of
σ2
ε/σ2
mc =0 .21. This implies that the variance of idiosyncratic bargaining shock only
have to be about 1/5 of the average real wage variance to generate the observed
U.S. inertia.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have argued that when ﬁrms have idiosyncratic components in
their marginal cost, they cannot compute the current price level perfectly before
they choose their own optimal price. Instead ﬁrms have to form an estimate of
the price level using the information contained in their own marginal cost and
observations of past inﬂation. This structure, coupled with the Calvo mechanism of
price adjustment, results in a Phillips curve with a role for higher order expectations
of marginal cost and future inﬂation. Even though the pricing decision is entirely
forward looking, lagged inﬂation will still have an impact on current inﬂation since
lagged inﬂation contains information on three quantities relevant for the optimal
price of the ﬁrm: (i) The current average marginal cost, (ii) the current average
marginal cost expectation hierarchy and (iii) the hierarchy of expected future prices.
We show that this ’information eﬀect’ can explain the positive coeﬃcient on lagged
inﬂation in estimates of the so called Hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips Curve.
8300 "monthly" observations was transformed into 100 "quarterly" observations. The estimates
displayed in the table are averages over 20 independent samples.
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their information set and that the structure of the economy is common knowl-
edge. These two assumptions, together with a structural model that implies that
the impact of higher order expectations are decreasing as the order of expectation
increases, allow us to derive a solution algorithm of arbitrary accuracy. The com-
plexity of the solution of the model presented here is naturally a drawback. Future
research should focus on deriving reduced forms of the model and specifying un-
der what changes in the environment they would be robust predictors of pricing
behavior.
We also propose a new approach to modeling imperfect common knowledge. In-
stead of working with noise and signals, we let the agents observe real, but partly
idiosyncratic quantities perfectly, as well as lagged aggregate variables. The vari-
ance of the idiosyncratic component determines how precise these quantities are as
indicators of economywide averages. This approach allows us to compare variances
of the model with variances in the data and ask whether information imperfec-
tions are likely to be large enough in reality to be important for the dynamics of
the model. It is hard to argue that these observations are the only information
available to agents in reality. However, a necessary condition for limited informa-
tion availability (or limited capacity to process information) based explanations of
economic phenomena to be plausible, is that quantities that are immediately and
costlessly observable to agents are not too informative. In the speciﬁcc a s ec o n s i d -
ered here, we found that the ﬁrm level idiosyncratic wage variances necessary to
replicate U.S. inﬂation dynamics is about 1/5 of the overall variance of real wages.
Quantitative information on the magnitude of unexplained ﬁrm level variations in
real wages are hard to come by, but there are some studies where this information
can be extracted as a by-product. Martins (2003) investigates the competitiveness
of the Portuguese garment industry labor market using yearly data, and ﬁnds that
between 30 and 40 percent of the ﬁrm average wage variations cannot be explained
by neither labor market conditions, changes in the skills of workers, production
techniques or (time dependent) ﬁrm level ﬁxed eﬀects. Though not necessarily
representative, it is not obvious if this is likely to be lower or higher than in other
industries and countries and a variance ratio of 1/5 is not conspicuously unrealistic.
Our model also suggests an explanation for the observed higher inﬂation inertia in
the U.S. relative to the Euro area. European wage bargaining is often centralized,
while in the U.S. a larger fraction of wages are set at the ﬁrm level.9 There is
thus likely to be more ﬁrm level variations in wages in the U.S. than in Europe,
which in our model would lead to more inertia, and could thus explain the observed
diﬀerences. The relation between the degree of wage centralization and inﬂation
inertia, as well as actual magnitudes of random variations in ﬁrm level wages will
be investigated in future work.
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i (pt+i + mct+i(j)) (A.8)
Appendix B. Deriving a Forward Looking Phillips Curve with
Imperfect Common Knowledge
Let the price level follow
pt = θpt−1 +( 1− θ)p∗
t (B.1)
where p∗
t is the average price chosen by ﬁrms resetting their price in period t. The
optimal price of ﬁrm j is a discounted sum of ﬁrm j0s current and future nominal






i (pt+i + mct+i(j)) (B.2)
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p∗
t(j)=( 1− βθ)Et(j)(pt + mct(j)) + Et(j)βθp∗
t+1(j) (B.3)
To set the optimal price, ﬁrm j need to form an estimate of the price level. Substi-
tute (B.1) into(B.3) to get
p∗
t(j)=( 1− βθ)Et(j)([θpt−1 +( 1− θ)p∗
t]+mct(j)) + Et(j)βθp∗
t+1(j) (B.4)
where the average reset price p∗
t is
p∗
t =( 1− βθ)Et (pt + mct)+Etβθp∗
t+1 (B.5)
Repeated substitution of (B.5) and (B.1) into (B.4) yields
p∗
t(j)=( 1 − βθ)Et(j)((θpt−1 + (B.6)
(1 − θ)(1− βθ)Et(θpt−1 +







Continued substitution and averaging across ﬁrms yields
p∗
t =( 1 − βθ)
∞ X
k=0














Substitute (B.7) into (B.1) to get
pt =( 1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
∞ X
k=0







(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)θ
1 − ((1 − θ)(1 − βθ))
¶
pt−1 +( 1− θ)θβ
∞ X
k=0







(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)θ
1 − ((1 − θ)(1 − βθ))
¶
=
θ(1 − ((1 − θ)(1 − βθ))) + θ(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)






1+β−θβpt and subtract 1
1+β−θβpt−1 and pt to/from both sides to get
1
1+β − θβ
(pt − pt−1)=( 1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
∞ X
k=1
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1+β−θβ
(pt − pt−1)=( 1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
∞ X
k=0












simplify and add and subtract
β (θ − 1)(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0




and use that θ((1 + β − θβ)) = 1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ) to get
πt =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=1




+(θ − 1)βpt (B.12)
+β (1 − θ)(1− (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0




+β (θ − 1)(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0




−β (θ − 1)(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))Et
∞ X
k=0




Inﬂation can now be rewritten as a function of higher order expectations of current
marginal cost and inﬂation plus an error term that is a sum of the discrepancies of
the higher order beliefs of the pricelevel and the actual pricelevel
πt =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0




+β (1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0






pt − (1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0





w h e r ew eu s e d
θpt +( 1− θ)Etp∗
t+1 − pt =( θ − 1)pt +( 1− θ)Etp∗
t+1 = Etπt+1
This is equation (2.7) in Section 2 of the main text.
To write the model in the form of (C.1) use that
pt = pt−1 + πt. (B.14)
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πt =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0




+β (1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0




+(θ − 1)β[(θpt−1 + θπt) −
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0










Collect all terms with actual period t inﬂation on the left hand side and use that
the lagged pricelevel is common knowledge
(1 − (θ − 1)β)πt = (B.16)
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0




+β (1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0






(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0






Divide both sides with (1 − (θ − 1)β)
πt =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
(1 − (θ − 1)β)θ
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0





β (1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
(1 − (θ − 1)β)
∞ X
k=0






(1 − (θ − 1)β)
"
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
∞ X
k=0





The Phillips curve (B.17) is now in the required form for the solution algorithm of
Appendix C.
Appendix C. Solution with Exogenous Marginal Cost
C.1. Step 1: The Impact of Expectations on Inﬂation. In the ﬁrst part of
t h es o l u t i o nw ew i l lu s et h et w oc o n s i s t e n c yrestrictions to eliminate expectation
hierarchies of the endogenous inﬂation rate from the Phillips curve (2.7). First, use
that
pt = pt−1 + πt






































where f,g and h are row vectors of appropriate dimensions. Denote the elements
of the row vectors as
£
f1 f2 ··· fk
¤
etc., where the respective elements are
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fk =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
(1 − (θ − 1)β)θ
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))[(1 − βθ)(1 − θ)]
k−1 (C.2)
gk =
β (1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))
(1 − (θ − 1)β)




1 − (θ − 1)β
(1 − (1 − βθ)(1 − θ))[(1 − βθ)(1 − θ)]
k−1 (C.4)
One should not that the elements of (C.2), (C.3) and (C.4) decreases as k increases
since 0 < (1−βθ)(1−θ) < 1. Use the rationality assumptions to move the hierarchy









































































     

D e n o t et h el e f th a n ds i d ec o e ﬃcient matrix H. Pre-multiply with the inverse of H
to get







































     

. (C.6)
Inﬂation can now be written as a function of only the hierarchies of expectations


























where a and b are the ﬁrst rows of H−1F and H−1G respectively.































































Repeated forward substitution of (C.8) into (C.7) will yield a convergent solution
for inﬂation as a function of the hierarchy of current marginal cost expectations
as long as the elements of b and the largest eigenvalue of M are smaller than
one in absolute value. Restricting the solution to only include expectations up to
the k
th
order allow us to write inﬂation as a function of a ﬁnite number of con-
vergent weighted sums of current and expected future hierarchies of marginal cost
expectations. This solution method is conceptually similar to solving a complete
information rational expectations model by forward substitution, where we treat
the marginal cost expectation hierarchy as the fundamental.
C.1.1. Illustrating the method with k=2. We can illustrate the methodology by
setting k =2 . While not suﬃcient to achieve an accurate solution to the model, it


























Use the ﬁrst consistency restriction, i.e. rationality of the ﬁrst order expectation,

















































































Note that, by ignoring terms of higher than second order and by invoking the second
restriction that ﬁrms do not believe that other ﬁrms use a diﬀerent model, the sum
of second order inﬂation expectations on the second line of (C.13) can be written





























We have thus found an approximate, though with k =2not very accurate, solution
of inﬂation as a function of only the hierarchy of expectations of current marginal
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To ﬁnd the vector c in the conjectured solution (4.1), we add the subvectors that
each involve the hierarchy of marginal cost expectations from order 0 to 2, from 1
to 2, and 2 in the following way


























c0 = a1:3 (C.19)
c1 = a1:2(I − b1M1:2)−1b1M1:2 (C.20)
c2 = a1:1b2(I − b1M1:1)−1(I − b1M1:1)−1M1:1 (C.21)
C.1.2. The general case. For the general case the same strategy is followed to ﬁnd






















































0 ··· 0 ck
¤
(C.23)
The formulas for the individual subvectors c0,c1,...,ck,...,ck get increasingly com-
plex as k increases and the general formula for k ≥ 2 is
ck =
X
αb qbr....bs | {z }








w h e r ew es u mo v e r
∀ q,r,...s :( q − 1) + (r − 1) + ... +( s − 1) = k − 1
and α is equal to the number of unique orderings of bq,b r,...,bs.
The structure of (C.24) can be understood in the following way. We have or-
ganized the subvectors of c such that ck captures the impact of expectations from
order k to k. ck thus do not capture any eﬀects of lower than the kthorder. The
number α as the number of ’paths’ including the qth,rth,...,sth orders of expecta-
tion, in h ’steps’ that will ’loose’ k orders (i.e. from zero to k −1) of marginal cost
expectations. For an example, second order expectations of third order inﬂation
expectations of inﬂation will not be a function of marginal cost expectations of
lower or equal order than four, i.e. (2 − 1) + (3 − 1) + 1. The same is true for the
reverse ’path’ of expectations, i.e. third order expectations of second order inﬂation
expectations. Once we have calculated c for the desired order of expectations we
can continue to the second step of the solution algorithm.
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section we will derive the law of motion for the hierarchy of marginal cost expec-
tations, taking its impact on inﬂation as given. We will use a state representation
similar in spirit to the one in Woodford (2002). However, due to the forward look-
ing nature of inﬂation, we will not be able to reduce the state to a 2 × 1 vector.
Instead, actual average marginal cost and the hierarchy of average expectations of
average marginal cost up to the k
th
order will be treated as a hidden state, that
ﬁrms will estimate using the Kalman ﬁlter. Since the state to be estimated includes
the hierarchy of estimates, the Kalman ﬁlter determines both the estimates and and



















         

(C.25)
Use the conjectured law of motion of the the marginal cost hierarchy (4.2) to ﬁnd
the implied law of motion for the state Xt



















where K is the Kalman gain matrix, Zt(j) is ﬁrm j’s observation vector containing
its own marginal cost and the lagged aggregate pricelevel. L is a matrix that maps













K = PL0(LPL0 + Σεε)−1 (C.31)
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matrix Σuu is given by
Σuu =





























0 0 000 0

        

(C.34)
As will be shown below, the structure of the ﬁltering problem (C.28), the deﬁnition

























But we are not quite there yet. First, take averages over (C.28) to get






One should note that the idiosyncratic component gets ’washed out’ in aggregation.
Partition and use the deﬁnition of Xt




















W11 − [KLW]11 W12 − [KLW]12
W21 − [KLW]21 W22 − [KLW]22
¸

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

















ρK11 + K12c1 W11 − [KLW]11 + K12c2:k
¸








































Solving the model implies ﬁnding a ﬁxed point of the system described by (C.23),
(C.27), (C.30), (C.31), (C.32) (C.34), (C.41) and (C.42).
Appendix D. Solution with Endogenous Marginal cost
We restrict the explanation of the solution under endogenous marginal cost to
the instances where it diﬀers from the solution under exogenous marginal costs.
Output is determined by the IS equation and the Taylor rule
yt = Etyt+1 −
1
γ
(it − Etπt+1) (D.1)
it = φππt + φyyt (D.2)
and the actual marginal cost of ﬁrm j is given by
mct(j)=( γ + ϕ)yt + ξt + εt(j) (D.3)
Conjecture that output and inﬂation are linear functions of the hierarchy of pref-
erence shock expectations

















































 + e nvt (D.6)
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April 2005D.1. Finding e c. Replace the actual average marginal cost of ﬁrms in the Phillips
curve (C.1) with the average of ﬁrms’ beginning-of-period estimate of their own
marginal cost












 + ωt(j) (D.7)
Taking averages
Z












 + ξt (D.8)
since Z
ωt(j)=ξt (D.9)
With some abuse of notation, denote the average of ﬁrms’ beginning-of-period es-
timate Z
Et(j)mct(j)dj ≡ f mc
(0)
t (D.10)
The hierarchy of beginning-of-period estimates can then be written as a function
of the preference shock expectation hierarchy





























   

































































1( γ + ϕ)d1 ··· (γ + ϕ)dk
01( γ + ϕ)d1
. . .



























1( γ + ϕ)d1 ··· (γ + ϕ)dk
01( γ + ϕ)d1
. . .



















   

(D.14)
For a given e d and f M, the subvectors e ck of e c
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e ck =
X
αb qbr....bs | {z }
h =# of b0s
a1:k−k e D1:k−k
³
I − b1f M1:k−5
´−1 ³





D.2. Finding e d. The system
yt = Etyt+1 −
1
γ
(it − Etπt+1) (D.17)
























 + e nvt (D.19)
can be rewritten as







γ e c −
φy
γ







γ e c −
φy
γ








   















































For given e c, e d,a n df M a’ n e w ’e d can be found by standard full information linear
rational expectations solution methods if the largest eigenvalue of f M lies within
t h eu n i tc i r c l e .W ec a nt h e nu s eaS h u rd e c o m p o s i t i o na si nB l a n c h a r da n dK a h n
(1980), to get the forward looking jump variable yt as a function of the zero to k
orders of predetermined marginal cost expectations.
D.3. Finding f M. f M can be found by similar methods as in the previous section.
The diﬀerences will be the vector of observables Zt(j) and the matrix mapping an























ρK11 + K12c1 + K13d1 W11 − [KLW]11 + K12c2:k + K12d2:k
¸
(D.23)
Solving the model implies ﬁnding a ﬁxed point of the system described by (D.15),
(D.20), (D.22) and (D.23).
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